“Good” is an ambiguous term. Can it refer to non-moral referents, such as food? Can the useful be good? Or should it be used only in a moral sense, so that nothing can be called “good” for man except virtue?

Philip Melanchthon addressed this question in part through explaining how the term “good” is used in the Bible. What follows is an excerpt from my forthcoming translation of Melanchthon’s Summary of Moral Philosophy (Lexham Press).

Melanchthon on the Meaning of “Good”

In the Sacred Scriptures, “good” is understood in a threefold way. First, it stands for that which has been created and ordered by God. All things that are called “goods of nature” are of this kind. For all created things are appointed for a certain use and for the preservation of nature. Second, “good” means a thing that is ἀδιάφορον [adiaphoron, “indifferent”], that is, a thing that is permitted by the law of God. “Good” is understood in this way when Paul says, “It is good for a man not to eat meat.” Here, “good” is opposed to what is prohibited. Third, “good” means the actions of virtue that God commands, or the forms of the worship of God that are true and that have, in fact, been commanded by God, as we read in the prophet: “This is the good: to walk before God, and to fear God.” I do not wish to refute the Stoics at great length, since both the Sacred Scriptures and common speech attribute the name “good” to useful things. Indeed, the Stoics themselves have added a correction to their own paradox, because they admit that we should maintain the view that useful things should be sought in their own place. For that reason, they invented another word, namely προηγμένα [proēgmena], that is, “preferred.” Now, if you were to ask here why useful things should be preferred, you will still in the end have to land on a cause: because they are appropriate to nature. This, then, is the definition of “good” in general: a thing that is appropriate to nature. We should therefore maintain the division of Aristotle, who calls “goods” not only virtue, but also things that are useful and pleasant, though he places them in a hierarchical order.