In honor of the upcoming American observance of Thanksgiving, here is a passage from Philip Melanchthon on gratitude, from my forthcoming translation of his Summary of Moral Philosophy (Philosophiae moralis epitome). In this excerpt, Melanchthon draws on both classical and biblical wisdom to explicate the duty and debt of gratitude that we owe to others.
Gratitude
Gratitude ought in turn to be the response to generosity.[1] For that reason, the order of the virtues itself demands that I now speak about gratitude. For gratitude is the virtue by means of which we return the thanks owed to those who have deserved well of us, both by kindness and eagerness of mind and by other duties. I call it “owed” because by natural obligation we owe thanks to those who have deserved well of us, even if we are not always obligated in civil terms. Consequently, because thanks is owed in some way, gratitude is adjacent to justice, or is a type of it. Since, therefore, all injustice conflicts with human society, the ungrateful also should be judged to be enemies of human society, for without this mutual and gratuitous sharing of duties, human society cannot be preserved. For unless there are mutual duties, kindness cannot last long, and inequality is itself unjust and hostile to nature, since we are all born for mutual preservation.[2] For that reason, the jurists correctly say that we are obligated by nature with respect to ἀντίδωρα [antidōra, “gifts given in return”];[3] and, although the laws do not give grounds for bringing legal action in each and every instance of ingratitude, they still inflict an extraordinary punishment on the ungrateful when they drag ungrateful freedmen back into servitude. They allow gifts to be taken back on account of ingratitude. Likewise, they allow ungrateful children to be disinherited and property to be seized from an ungrateful vassal.
But it is characteristic of a well educated mind to perceive that ingratitude displeases God and that it is punished by God, according to the statement of Solomon in Proverbs 17: “If you return evil for good, evil will not withdraw from your house.”[4] The fourth commandment, too, gives a command about gratitude: “Honor your father and mother, that you may live long upon the land.” It is enough to have said these things by way of reminder concerning the causes of gratitude and the punishment of ingratitude, for everyone’s books are full of the praises of this virtue. Indeed, God has sketched out images of it even in beasts, in which we discern a certain perception of kindness to be present. For the story of the lion is well known, and its ἀντιπελαργεῖν [antipelargein, “acting as a foster parent”] was borrowed from the storks.[5] And it is shameful for men to be surpassed by beasts in performing the duties of virtue.
What should be the limit in returning thanks?
The gratitude of the mind, as is the case with the other virtues, ought to be constant; and, since we ought to embrace gratitude for the sake of virtue, virtue should rouse itself and stretch itself forth in small acts of kindness, and should produce true goodwill and a keen desire to deserve well of others, not only for the sake of profit, but also for the sake of our duty and humanity. But in external duties involved in paying back favors, on the other hand, a limit is sought; this we should establish by the principle of similarity, in accordance with the precept of Hesiod, namely, that we pay back αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ καὶ λώιον αἴ κε δύναιο [autō tō metrō kai lōion ai ke dunaio, “by the same measure, and more if you can”].[6] For it is a most humane precept that commands us to surpass a kindness that has been given, as long as you are able to. However, there are very many things that cannot be repaid merely by means of external duties, where we ought to pay acts of kindness back with an even greater goodwill and an even greater zeal of the mind, as is the case with God, parents, teachers, the church, our country, and those who have deserved well of the commonwealth.
References
| ↑1 | Generosity is the topic of the preceding section. |
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| ↑2 | Cf. Cicero, On Duties 1.22; On Ends 3.62-68. |
| ↑3 | Cf. Digest of Justinian 5.3.25(11). An almost identical expression is found in a 1532 letter of Boniface Amerbach to Erasmus: obligatus sum ad ἀντίδωρα (“I am obligated with respect to gifts given in return” (Erasmus, Letter 2706). |
| ↑4 | Ex. 20:12; cf. Dt. 5:16. |
| ↑5 | Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 5.14, tells the story of the friendship between the slave Androclus and a lion. But Gellius says nothing about storks, and he does not use the word ἀντιπελαργεῖν [antipelargein, “acting as a foster parent”]; so what is the connection? Melanchthon means that the lion displayed the characteristic of antipelargein, which is associated elsewhere with storks. I assume that he has in mind Erasmus, Adages 1.10.1, where he says that the characteristic “is borrowed from the nature of the stork, which in Greek is called pelargus.” Cicero mentions the generosity of the stork in On Ends 3.63. |
| ↑6 | Hesiod, Works and Days 350. |