This title probably sounds boring to a lot of people. Don’t worry. I will get back to refuting the arguments for women’s ordination soon enough. But this post is necessary foundation work. “Natural Law” is enjoying something of a renaissance, particularly among Protestants who have not always been comfortable with it. But even among its new friends, natural law isn’t always explained well. It can often be invoked as a short cut or a conversation stopper.

On a somewhat related note, there are a few Edmund Burke-appreciators out there who explain Anglicanism by appeals to a kind of classic British “conservatism.” These people aren’t necessarily conservatives themselves, but they argue that the Anglican disposition and mood is that of the Burkean sort of conservative. This means that Anglicans should not be Biblicists, fundamentalists, theonomists, or anything of that sort. Instead, they should appreciate the way that history, culture, and custom shape the business of politics, statecraft, and even ecclesiology. I’ll come back to this in a later post, but for now let’s just say that while this might be true enough, I also don’t think these folks are giving us the full picture on the classic way that a well-bred Brit went about his “natural law” decision making. History, culture, and custom are all very good things, but they must be anchored.

And so here I want to lay out a brief sketch of how natural law “works” in more practical ways. And I’d also like to explain the role of custom in natural law thinkers, as well as the way that nature must still guide custom. This is going to be useful. I promise.

Natural Law

Natural Law is a really helpful tool to have. It’s overwhelmingly traditional, so that works for those of us who believe that learning from the history of the church and following the accumulation of truth throughout the ages is important. In addition to the historical high ground, natural law is also important because it serves as an external and objective standard to which all humans are held. It is not merely a perspective or a viewpoint. It’s not even a “claim” from a tradition or “community.” It is how we are created. It is the law of our nature. Natural law explains the way that reality is constructed. For more on this, see C.S. Lewis’ The Abolition of Man.

But having heaped up such praise, it is also the case that natural law, at its core, is extremely basic. The classic definition of natural law is “seek the good and avoid the evil” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, 94.ii, co.). The self-evident aspect of that definition is the point– it’s true by necessity. But it’s also so general that you have to say more. And the more you say, the farther you get from the self-evident basic. And at a certain point, you aren’t just pointing out “nature.” You are actually engaging in speculative and then practical reasoning. The more particular you get, the more difficult. And the more likely that you might make a mistake.

And that means that “natural law” always requires deliberation, prudence, and political rule. Thomas Aquinas asserts that human law projects always involve a “science” and an “art” (ST I-II, 95. ii, co.).¹ The scientific element of human law is when specific conclusions are logically derived from first principles. An example would be when the premise “do harm to no man” leads to the conclusion “one must not kill.” One could derive similar conclusions, such as the prohibition against assault, from the same principle. The artistic element of human law, however, is when the “general forms are particularized into details” (ST I-II, 95. ii, co.). To explain this, Thomas gives the example of deciding on a particular sort of punishment. “That the evil-doer should be punished” is a strict conclusion from the law of nature, but “that he be punished this or that way” is what Thomas calls “a determination of the law of nature.” The determination involves human art and is necessarily more subjective.

The Role of Custom

This artistic realm of human law involves strict positive laws, as in the above case of specific penalties, but it also involves custom. Customs are “repeated external actions” which “effectually declar[e]” the “concepts of reason” (ST I-II, 97. iii, co.). Examples of customs would be the practice of standing when an honored person enters a room or a ceremony like a marriage service (and its particular elements). While more subjective than positive law and involving less immediately coercive force, customs are nevertheless extremely powerful elements of human law and social life. They are a practical way to “incline [people] to acts of virtue” (ST I-II, 95. i, co.).

This is also why customs must be rightly ordered and grounded in nature. If they are disordered, then customs can actually promote evil and have a seriously harmful effect upon society. Richard Hooker puts it this way: “lewd and wicked custom, beginning perhaps at the first among few, afterwards spreading into greater multitudes, and so continuing from time to time, may be of force even in plain things to smother the light of natural understanding” (Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity I.vi.11 vol. 1, Everyman’s Library, 1969, 184). Customs, then, are powerful social practices which can shape the human community towards virtue or vice, leading either to a reasonable conformity to the natural law or the collective loss of it. Indeed, as Thomas concludes, “custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law” (ST I-II, 97. iii, co.).

John Calvin made the same kind of argument. In a sermon on 1 Corinthians 11:11–16, he stated, “when there is an accepted custom, and it is a good and decent one, we must accept it. And whoever tries to change it is surely the enemy of the common good. . .” (Calvin, Men Women and Order in the Church: Three Sermons trans. Skolnitsky (Presbyterian Heritage Publications, 1992), 57). He qualifies that these customs must be “good and decent,” “according to nature,” and “edifying” (Calvin, 54). For Calvin, this is judged by “the word of God, the law of nature, and human decency” (Calvin, 55). Once good customs are identified, however, we should “agree that whatever is good for the well-being of the whole Church will be practiced, and let everyone keep to it” (Calvin, 60). Doing so will promote “meekness and humility” which in turn produces the “excellent virtue” of peace (Calvin, 62).

In his Biblical commentary on 1 Corinthians, Calvin says that when custom receives “universal consent,” it can even be called “nature” (Commentary on 1 Cor. 11:15). Thus, good customs are closely associated with the natural law. They promote the natural virtue on a social level by shaping habits and attitudes.

A final important concept for this discussion is “decorum.” Decorum indicates the proper use of customs for a virtuous purpose. Commenting on 1 Cor. 11:2, Calvin says:

For as a man’s dress or gesture has in some cases the effect of disfiguring, and in others of adorning him, so all actions are set off to advantage by decorum, and are vitiated by the want of it. Much, therefore, depends upon decorum (τὸπρεπον) and that not merely for securing for our actions gracefulness and beauty, but also to accustom our minds to propriety.

This is an important passage because it shows how Calvin handles a biblically prescribed custom. He does not see the custom as itself a divine-law command, but neither does he see it as mere cultural accommodation with no further grounding. Rather, Calvin sees the social custom as a means of affirming and promoting a natural virtue. The customs in 1 Cor. 11, the head covering (and long hair for women and short hair for men), are good and proper. Calvin fears that rashly setting aside such customs will lead to an overturning of the natural law. The term he uses to indicate the respect for and moderate use of customs is “decorum.”

Decorum

This slightly old-fashioned “decorum” represents another important category. It does not simply mean being well-mannered. It was a part of classical natural law moral reasoning.

The editor of Calvin’s commentaries adds a note directing us to Cicero for a fuller understanding of decorum. In his work On Moral Duties, Cicero discusses “decorum” or “becomingness” at some length. Cicero defines decorum as that “which is so in accordance with nature as to present the aspect of moderation or self-restraint” (Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis, I.27). A little later he illustrates this point by saying that “it is the part of justice not to injure men; of courtesy, not to give them offense, and it is in this last that the influence of becomingness is most clearly seen.” Thus, “becomingness,” or decorum, is the wise application of justice to specific related actions and behaviors, in keeping with the nature of things. It describes what is “proper” of “fitting” for any given occasion. We might also say that decorum is a shorthand way to express that a custom is indeed in accordance with nature and is being applied in an appropriate way for the right objective.

When we consider this classical context, the Apostle Paul’s appeal to decorum (he does so in 1 Cor. 11, but also in 1 Tim. 2:10) can be seen as a theologically informed but otherwise typical piece of late-antique Greco-Roman moral philosophy. It is what we should expect from someone writing within this cultural milieu. Viewed from the internal logic of 1 Cor. 11, it also makes good sense. Paul is discussing a matter of custom which he grounds in nature, in the creation of Adam and Eve. Paul wants women to dress and behave in a certain way in order to signify how God made them, and he believes that their doing so will be a way of exhibiting self-control on a social level. This is a classic case of decorum.

Turning our attention to 1 Timothy 2, we can again see this key word, πρέπει (1 Tim. 2:10). Paul says that it is “proper” or “fitting” for a woman to adorn herself with good deeds. Again, Paul is promoting decorum. This fits the larger argument. The chapter begins with a general call to honor authority by praying and then living in peace and quiet (1 Tim. 2:1–2). After an explanation about prayer and the mediatorial work of Christ (vss. 3–7), Paul then states that he wants the men to pray “without anger or quarreling” (vs. 8). When he moves to the women, Paul continues to emphasize peaceable virtues, but specifically “modesty and self-control” (vs. 9). These become their proper “adornment,” not physical things characteristic of luxury or haughtiness, but rather a quiet and submissive demeanor (vss. 9–11). This is then further exhibited in not teaching or exercising authority over a man (vs. 12). Finally, Paul reminds the people of their natural state, how God originally created mankind (vs. 13), and he points women towards childrearing, carried out in faith, love, and holiness with self-control (vs. 15).

Taken collectively, this is the decorum for the people of God. Whereas Paul prescribes a literal outward adornment in 1 Corinthians 11:1–6, in 1 Timothy 2:8–15 he appeals to demeanor and practice. In both cases, though, he is calling the church to maintain a fitting order which testifies of God’s creation in a moderate way by respecting particular customs.

1. The bulk of this essay is taken from my older article here: https://cbmw.org/2020/11/20/good-and-proper-pauls-use-of-nature-custom-and-decorum-in-pastoral-theology/ ↩︎